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1. Introduction
The European Community (EC) is comprised of independent
European nation states who recognized that unification could yield
competitive advantages in the international market.' In an attempt
to realize the benefits of an internal common market, the European
Economic Community Treaty (EEC Treaty) was created to develop
a general governing system for the individual nation states; however,
intellectual property rights have not been specifically provided for in
the EEC Treaty.2 As long as national copyright laws were not used
to arbitrarily restrict or discriminate in trade between Member
States, Article 36 of the EEC Treaty provided the protection granted
by these laws.' However, Article 36 will not tolerate "abusive exer-
cise of copyright protection with the aim of creating barriers to the
free movement of goods or hindering competition in the European
Community."4
Presently, intra-community trade directly and adversely affects
the competing national intellectual property laws.5 Since national
rules regarding intellectual property have not been standardized by
Community law, copyright protection has been left to the discretion
of each individual Member State.' If necessary for reasons of public
interest, unharmonized national laws entitle Member States to per-
mit barriers to free trade.7 While the EEC Treaty does not directly
1. EUROPEAN COMMUNITY INFORMATION SERVICE, EUROPEAN COMMUNITY: THE FACTS
2 (1974) [hereinafter EUROPEAN COMMUNITY INFORMATION SERVICE].
2. Treaty Establishing the European Economic Community, Mar. 25, 1957, 298
U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter EEC Treaty].
3. EEC Competition Policy: Commission Supremacy Over National Copyright Rules
Established in Key Court Ruling, [Aug.-Sept.] European Information Service (Multinational
Serv.) No. 313, at 10 (1991) [hereinafter EEC Competition Policy].
4. Id.
5. Completing the Internal Market (The White Paper), Commission of the Eur. Comm.,
part. II, § 1(60) (June 1985) [hereinafter Completing the Internal Market].
6. British Broadcasting Corporation and Another v. Commission of the European Com-
munities, No. T-70/89, at 16 (E. Comm. Ct. J. July 10, 1991) (LEXIS, Eurcom library,
Cases file) [hereinafter BBC v. Commission]. "National rules" are the legislative rules of the
individual Member States.
7. Deringer, Legal Problems of Satellite and Cable T. V. within the European Commu-
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regulate intellectual property rights, national copyright protection is
not free from evaluation. Intellectual property rights are indirectly
controlled by ensuring that owner's rights do not violate Article 85
and 86 of the EEC Treaty.8 Article 85 prohibits actions that ad-
versely affect trade among Member States. Article 86 supports this
position by not permitting a party to abuse a dominant position in
the market to detrimentally affect trade among Member States.
This Comment will analyze three recent cases which involved
broadcasters who controlled their copyrights in television program
listings to deny third parties the chance to enter derivative markets
of comprehensive television guides. The potential effects of these
cases on the European Community will also be discussed. To achieve
a better understanding of the European Community and how it ini-
tially developed, this analysis will first explain the European Com-
munity's history, in Section II. Section III sets forth the goals of the
European Economic Community (EEC). Section IV compares the
delicate balance between national sovereignty and supranationalism
interests that needed to be addressed, in order to form the unified
entity known as the European Community. Section V explains the
EEC's founding document and its subsequent treatment of intellec-
tual property rights.
In Section VI, a closer analysis of the three recent television
broadcaster cases will address the conflict between national intellec-
tual property protection and Community law as established by the
EEC Treaty. Through careful analysis of Articles 85 and 86 of the
EEC Treaty and the Berne Convention, the European Community
Court of Justice clearly explicated the reasons why Community law
was superior to national intellectual property laws.
II. History of the European Community
The European Community has been in the developmental stages
since 1945. 9 After World War II, the European countries realized
that their global economic pre-eminence had been displaced by the
United States (U.S.) and the former Union of Soviet Socialist Re-
publics (U.S.S.R.). 10 World War II resulted in great damage to Eu-
i'ope's industrial capital. Furthermore, Third World markets, who
previously were the consumers of Europe's manufactured goods,
were now relying on the United States for their supplies.'
By promoting free interstate trade uninhibited by the regula-
nities, II INT'L Bus. LAW. 21, 23 (1983).
8. EEC Treaty, supra note 2, art. 36.
9. R. HUDSON. D. RHINO & H. MOUNSEY. AN ATLAS OF EEC AFFAIRS 1 (1984) [here-
inafter R. HUDSON].
10. Id.
IH. Id.
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tions of individual states, the United States federal system strength-
ened its national industry.1" "Taking a lesson from United States
history, albeit two hundred years later, the European Community is
seeking to strengthen its internal market."' 3 To stabilize their falter-
ing European economies and to give them the power to compete in
the international market, the European countries realized that the
sacrifice of national sovereignty was needed to establish a unified
group."' The inherent danger of unlimited national sovereignty was
evidenced by the fact that France and Germany were involved in
three wars in the past one-hundred years.15 These conflicts taught
the European countries that if Europe was to become a competitor in
the international market, unity among the various nation states
would have to be achieved.'6
The importance of European unity was further realized when
the economic crises in 1947 emphasized Europe's continuing depen-
dence on economic support from the United States.' 7 The economic
crisis of 1947 prompted the United States to create a redevelopment
plan to re-establish Europe's production in an attempt to stimulate
the economy.' 8 The U.S. supported The Marshall Plan which pro-
vided the post-war reconstruction program for Europe.' 9 A condition
of The Marshall Plan was that states who received these reconstruc-
tion benefits were mandated to organize and manage a common eco-
nomic policy.20 In an attempt to achieve this required condition, the
Benelux Union, comprised of Belgium, the Netherlands, and Luxem-
bourg, developed as a mini-Common Market.2' Also in 1947, "the
more general Economic Commission for Europe [ECE] was organ-
ized as a regional organization of the United Nations."22
The ECE's primary goal was to encourage European co-opera-
12. Keating, The European Community - 1992 and Beyond: The Implications of a
Single Europe on Intellectual Property, 9 DICK. J. INT'L L. 53 (1991).
13. Id.
14. EUROPEAN COMMUNITY INFORMATION SERVICE, supra note 1, at 2.
15. Id.
16. Id.
17. T. GEIGER. TRANSATLANTIC RELATIONS IN THE PROSPECT OF AN ENLARGED EURO-
PEAN COMMUNITY 3 (1970). The destruction and disruption of the war had caused the Euro-
pean nations to experience supply levels that were insufficient to meet minimum consumption
and reconstruction needs. Resource deficiencies resulted in continued strict rationing of food,
fuel, raw materials, and other necessary products despite the war's conclusion.
18. Id. The United States plan for European redevelopment is commonly referred to as
The Marshall Plan. The Marshall Plan "aimed to rebuild European productive capacity to the
pre-war level within a four year period and, through capital investment and technical improve-
ment, to lay the foundations for continuing increases in productivity and output." Id.
19. Id. The United States supported emergency relief to Europe by importing consum-
ers' goods, fuel, and raw materials. The supply of replacement parts to help undamaged or
minimally damaged factories was an effort to facilitate the European nation states' transition
back into production after the destructive war ended.
20. R. HUDSON, supra note 9, at 2.
21. Id.
22. Id.
Winter 1992]
DICKINSON JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW
tion throughout the continent. The ECE actively promoted this coop-
eration in response to the "Cold War" that simultaneously divided
Europe into two groups with very different ideologic bases." In 1948
the ECE western members subsequently formed the Organization
for European Economic Co-operation (OEEC)" 4
The OEEC had a significant impact on the promotion of eco-
nomic growth and integration throughout Europe. In fact, the OEEC
was responsible for developing the European Payments Union
(EPU).25 The EPU focused on facilitating the conversion of currency
among its Member States. 6 Inherently, a common currency was
needed if the objectives of free trade in a unified European Commu-
nity were to be realized.2 7
Realizing the importance of political and economic integration,
Belgium, France, Germany, Italy, Luxembourg, and the Netherlands
formed the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC). This or-
ganized action formally began the European Community's (EC) de-
velopment.2" Later, plans for a European Defense Community and a
European Political Union failed to materialize. Consequently, in
1955, the six countries that founded ECSC in 1951, decided to cre-
ate the European Economic Community.2 9 The EEC was created to
foster a common market for the European countries. In turn, the
common market has promoted the free movement of goods, services,
labor, and capital, commonly referred to as the "four freedoms. 3 0
The European Community consists of the European Coal & Steel
Community (ECSC), the European Economic Community (EEC)
and the European Atomic Energy Community (EURATOM).3 1
England, interested in joining the EEC, arranged talks to con-
sider the possibility of expanding the EEC to create a larger West-
23. Id.
24. EUROPEAN COMMUNITY INFORMATION SERVICE, supra note 1, at 2. The Organiza-
tion for European Economic Co-operation (OEEC) evolved into the Organization for Eco-
nomic Co-operation and Development (OECD) in 1961. R. HUDSON, supra note 9, at 2.
25. R. HUDSON, supra note 9, at 2.
26. Id.
27. Id.
28. R. ABRAMS, P. CORNELIUS, P. HEDFORS, & G. TERSMAN, THE IMPACT OF THE EURO-
PEAN COMMUNITY'S INTERNAL MARKET-ON THE EFTA 4 (1990) [hereinafter R. ABRAMS].
"The ECSC was established by the Treaty in Paris in 1951. In March 1957, the Treaty of
Rome was signed, officially establishing the EEC. At the same time, the EURATOM was
established by a separate treaty." Id. at 58.
29. Id. at 4.
30. Id. The founding document of the EEC, the EEC Treaty, was signed in March
1957.
31. Id. at 58. The three organizations had separate purposes. EUROPEAN COMMUNITY
INFORMATION SERVICE, supra note 1, at 3. ECSC had displayed the advantages to be gained
in a large market where goods could move freely. The EEC aimed to further improve those
benefits by extending the free trade arrangement to all goods and products within the Euro-
pean Community. EURATOM was involved with researching new sources of fuel and develop-
ing peaceful uses of nuclear energy in the industrial environment.
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ern European free trade zone. 32 These talks, however, failed primar-
ily for two reasons. First, England insisted upon receiving
preferential treatment because of its Commonwealth ties and its spe-
cial relationship with the United States.3 1 Second, several EC mem-
ber countries, as well as the EC Commission, feared that expansion
at that time would undermine the EC consolidation process. 34 In re-
sponse to the EEC's rejection, "Austria, Denmark, Norway, Portu-
gal, Sweden, Switzerland, and the United Kingdom formed the Eu-
ropean Free Trade Association (EFTA) in January 1960."15
As early as 1961, England, Denmark, Norway, Sweden, Ire-
land, Austria, and Switzerland applied to the EEC for either associ-
ation or membership.36 However, problems with internal integration
of the existing EEC delayed this organization's expansion.3 7 Finally,
in 1973, after three years of negotiations, Denmark, England, and
Ireland were offered membership into the EEC.38
Only EEC countries are members of the EC. Non-EEC mem-
bers, however, may elect to be associated with the EFTA organiza-
tion. Although the EC and EFTA share many similarities, the differ-
ences between these two organizations are just as important. When
these two organizations were being formed, the EC countries desired
a common economic, social, and political organization that relin-
quished each country's national authority and power to the central
32. Id.
33. Id. Britain was fully willing to accept Article 2 & 3 of the EEC Treaty. Britain said,
however, that it "'would have to negotiate special arrangements concerning British agriculture
and the interests of Commonwealth and European Free Trade Association countries [EFTA]."
GREAT BRITAIN CENTRAL OFFICE OF INFORMATION: REFERENCE DIVISION. BRITAIN AND THE
EUROPEAN COMMUNITY II (1976) [hereinafter GREAT BRITAIN CENTRAL OFFICE OF
INFORMATION].
34. R. ABRAMS, supra note 28, at 4. Difficulties were experienced in the EC consolida-
tion process. The EC was having trouble undertaking the considerable modifications of eco-
nomic and social policies that were necessary steps in initially unifying the EC Member States.
GREAT BRITAIN CENTRAL OFFICE OF INFORMATION, supra note 33, at 10.
35. R. ABRAMS, supra note 28, at 4. The Council of Europe was founded in 1949. L.
HENKIN. R. PUGH. 0. SCHACHTER, & H. SMIT. INTERNATIONAL LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS
1049 (1980). The aim of the Council was "to achieve a greater unity between its members for
the purpose of safeguarding and realizing the ideals and principles which are their common
heritage and facilitating their economic and social progress." Statute of the Council of Europe,
May 5, 1949, 87 U.N.T.S. 103, at art. I. These two institutions, the Council of Europe and the
OEEC, represented the two different ideologies in Europe that were later to develop into the
European Free Trade Association (EFTA) and the European Economic Community (EEC). R.
HUDSON, supra note 9, at 2. EFTA expanded to include Finland in 1961 and Iceland in 1970.
R. ABRAMS, supra note 28, at 4.
36. GREAT BRITAIN CENTRAL OFFICE OF INFORMATION, supra note 33, at 11. Bilateral
trade flows indicate that many countries may have based their decision of joining either EEC
or EFTA on political considerations rather than economic reasons. R. ABRAMS, supra note 28,
at 4 n.8.
37. R. ABRAMS, supra note 28, at 4.
38. Id. Denmark and Britain left EFTA concurrently to join the EEC. Id. Today the
EEC members include Belgium, Denmark, France, Greece, Germany, Ireland, Italy, Luxem-
bourg, the Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, and the United Kingdom. EFTA membership is com-
prised of Austria, Finland, Iceland, Norway, Sweden, and Switzerland. Id. at I n.l.
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governing body.39 EFTA members, however, placed less power in
their central governing body because of their desire to preserve the
national sovereignty of the individual members.40 In addition, the
significant difference between these two groups was that the EC's
goal was to place the Member States' power secondary to the power
granted to the EC, while EFTA was unwilling to make such sacri-
fices of national control."1
Attempting to further the goal of achieving a unified common
market, in 1985 the EC Commission issued a document entitled
Completing the Internal Market. This document was a comprehen-
sive, step-by-step plan to create an integrated and coherent economic
framework for the EC Member States by January 1, 1993." The
plan was designed "to eliminate all manmade physical, technical and
fiscal barriers that could hinder the free functioning of a single mar-
ket in the EC."4 To achieve the internal market program, the twelve
members had to amend the EEC Treaty which was accomplished by
the Single European Act of 1986.44
III. Goals of the European Community
On March 25, 1957, the European Economic Community
Treaty, also commonly referred to as the Treaty of Rome, was fi-
nally approved after extensive negotiations . 5 The EEC Treaty advo-
cates three central objectives. First, the EEC Treaty establishes that
internal customs duties will be eliminated and eventually replaced by
a common tariff on goods imported from non-Member States.46 The
second goal of the EEC Treaty is "to establish the foundations of an
ever closer union among the European Peoples," which emphasizes
that political integration is as important as economic integration.4 7
The EEC Treaty's last goal, economic integration, is clearly expli-
cated in Article II:
It shall be the aim of the Community, by establishing a
Common Market and progressively approximating the economic
policies of Member States, to promote throughout the commu-
nity a harmonious development of economic activities, a continu-
39. Id. at I.
40. GREAT BRITAIN CENTRAL OFFICE OF INFORMATION, supra note 33, at 10.
41. R. ABRAMS, supra note 28, at 1.
42. Id. at 5. The EC Commission is the executive and policy-proposing body of the
Communities. Id. at 57. The document entitled "Completing the Internal Market" is com-
monly referred to as "the White Paper." Id. at 5.
43. Id.
44. Id. Single European Act, 30 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. L 19) 1 (1987).
45. L HENKIN. R. PUGH. 0. SCHACHTER. & H. SMIT, INTERNATIONAL LAW: CASES AND
MATERIALS, 1073 (1980) [hereinafter L. HENKIN]. The Treaty was ratified in the second half
of 1957 and became effective on January 1, 1958.
46. Id. at 1074. EEC Treaty, supra note 2, art. 3.
47. EEC Treaty, supra note 2, preamble.
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ous and balanced expansion, an increased stability, an acceler-
ated raising of the standard of living, and closer relations
between its member states. 8
The governing institutions of the European Economic Commu-
nity, rather than the individual political desires of Member States,
usually have enforced the EEC Treaty. This has permitted the EEC
to develop a supra-national character.4 9 However, while the EEC
Treaty does rely on its own institutions for enforcement, this reliance
is not absolute. Many measures of regulating compliance with the
EEC Treaty are left to the authority of each Member State.50
The institutions, which were created to ensure proper obser-
vance and regulation of the EEC Treaty, are the following: the As-
sembly, the Council, the Commission, and the Court of Justice.51
The Assembly has 518 members who are elected to represent the
twelve EEC countries.5" The Assembly has no legislative authority. 53
However, the Assembly has served the EEC in an advisory capacity
and has the power to vote members of the Commission out of of-
fice. 54 The Council has one member represent each country, and that
member participates in legislative and executive capacities with a
weighted vote.55 Using a weighted vote allows the Council member's
ballot to proportionally represent the population of his Member
State in relation to the entire European Community.
The Commission is the principal executive power and may per-
form legislative functions if the Council grants it permission to do
so. 56 The Commission is "to act in complete independence and shall
not seek or accept any instructions from any government or other
body."' 57 If a Member State violates a standard set forth in the EEC
Treaty, the Commission may render a reasoned opinion requiring the
state to adjust its behavior to alleviate the violation.58 If the state
fails to correct the situation, the issue would be presented to the
48. Id., art. 2.
49. L. HENKIN, supra note 45, at 1077.
50.. Id.
51. E. NOEL. WORKING TOGETHER: THE INSTITUTIONS OF THE EUROPEAN ECONOMIC
COMMUNITY 3 (1979).
52. Id. The Assembly is also commonly referred to as the European Parliament (Parlia-
ment). The first direct elections of the Parliament were held in June 1979. Today, the Parlia-
ment is made up of 518 members. The seats in the Parliament are designated among the
twelve Member States in the following manner . . .eighty-one seats each for France, Ger-
many, Italy and the United Kingdom; forty-two seats each for Spain and Portugal; twenty-five
seats for the Netherlands; twenty-four seats each for Belgium and Greece; sixteen seats for
Denmark; fifteen seats for Ireland; and six seats for Luxembourg. Id.
53. L. HENKIN, supra note 45, at 1077.
54. Id.
55. Id. at 1078.
56. Id.
57. EEC Treaty, supra note 2, art. 157.
58. L. HENKIN, supra note 45, at 1078. See also EEC Treaty, supra note 2, art. 169.
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Court of Justice so that remedial actions could be ordered. 59
The Court of Justice is responsible for upholding the enforce-
ment of the EEC Treaty and for interpreting it when necessary to
ensure proper application. 0 Article 173 of the EEC Treaty grants
the Court of Justice the power to enter judgment on appeals "on
grounds of errors of substantial form, incompetence, infringement of
the EEC Treaty or any legal provision relating to its application, or
abuse of power. '"61 The Court of Justice has exclusive jurisdiction
over these types of cases. Member States may also appeal to the
Court of Justice if they feel that another member of the EC is in
violation of the Treaty provisions.62 While the complaint must ini-
tially be filed with the Commission, if the Commission fails to act
within three months, the Court of Justice has jurisdiction. 3
Besides hearing cases brought by EEC Institutions and Member
States, another important function of the Court of Justice is the re-
view of the national tribunals' application of Community law.6 ' The
Court of Justice often adjudicates cases involving Community law to
ensure that the tribunals of Member States are properly interpreting
the EEC Treaty. 5 The Court of Justice also has jurisdiction to re-
view complaints, presented by natural or legal persons, about EEC
Institution actions or inactions.6 However, a private individual with
a complaint concerning a Member State's abuse of the EEC Treaty
can not take this claim directly to the Court of Justice. Rather, the
individual must file it with the appropriate EEC Institution who,
upon determining the issue to be valid, may represent this claim
before the Court.6 7
IV. Balancing National Sovereignty and Supranationalism
The amount of power granted to the EC, a supranational insti-
tution, depends on an intricate balance between national sovereignty
and supranationalism.68 Sovereignty has been defined as the supreme
power over the territory and its inhabitants.6" On the other hand,
59. L. HENKIN, supra note 45, at 1078. See also EEC Treaty, supra note 2, art. 169.
60. L. HENKIN, supra note 45, at 1078. See also EEC Treaty, supra note 2, art. 164.
61. 'EEC Treaty, supra note 2, art. 173.
62. L. HENKIN, supra note 45, at 1079. See also EEC Treaty, supra note 2, art. 170.
63. L HENKIN, supra note 45, at 1079. See also EEC Treaty, supra note 2, art. 170.
64. L. HENKIN, supra note 45, at 1079. Community law is comprised of the rules that
govern the European Community as articulated in the EEC Treaty. Community law is supe-
rior to national laws if a conflict arises. "In an effort to promote uniformity of interpretation,
Article 177 of the EEC Treaty makes the Court competent to render preliminary decisions on
issues of Community law that arise in litigation conducted before national tribunals." Id. EEC
Treaty, supra note 2, art. 177.
65. L. HENKIN, supra note 45, at 1080. See also EEC Treaty, supra note 2, art. 177.
66. L. HENKIN, supra note 45, at 1080. See also EEC Treaty, supra note 2, art. 173.
67. L. HENKIN, supra note 45, at 1080. See also EEC Treaty, supra note 2, art. 177.
68. F GRIEVES. SUPRANATIONALISM AND INTERNATIONAL ADJUDICATION 1 (1969).
69. Id. at 3.
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supranationalism, not specifically defined, has developed as an ab-
stract concept.70 Supranationality refers to a type of integration in
which more power than is customary is given to the new central
agency, such as in the case of a conventional international organiza-
tion, although this is still less power than is generally granted to an
emergent federal government.' However, the term supranationalism
was not directly used in the EEC Treaty because it is a vague con-
cept that has political rather than legal significance.72
The creation of supranational institutions, such as the EC, re-
quires political leaders of independent nations to "shift their loyal-
ties, expectations, and political activities towards a new center,
whose institutions possess or demand jurisdiction over pre-existing
national states."73 Integration involves attention to national, private,
and EC interests with appropriate consideration being given to con-
flicting goals. 74 Integration is a cumulative process of learning how
to interact with previously separate groups. If the EEC objectives
were to be realized, European nations knew that some sovereign
powers would have to be relinquished to the EC governing body.
75
The EEC's immediate objectives included the establishment of a
Common Agricultural Policy, a Common Transport Policy, a Euro-
pean Social Fund, and a Customs Union.76 In accomplishing these
objectives, the EEC would promote the "four great freedoms": the
free movement of persons, goods, capital, and services.
77
V. The EEC Treaty
To be stronger competitors in the international market the Eu-
ropean Nations drafted the European Economic Community Treaty
with the goal of unification. 8 Trade-offs and co-operative solutions
in policy decisions among the Member States were necessary in or-
der to promote the well-being of the Community.79 Policy decisions,
by their very nature, will result in winners and losers. If the individ-
ual losers are compensated from the benefits gained by the organiza-
tion as a.whole, pursuit of the policy will be advantageous in the
end. 80 "If the leaders of the constituent countries are sensible, the
70. Id. at 10.
71. Id.
72. Id. at II.
73. M. HEWSTONE. UNDERSTANDING ATTITUDES TO THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY: A So-
CIAL-PSYCHOLOGICAL STUDY IN FOUR MEMBER STATES 12 (1986).
74. T. GEIGER, supra note 17, at 28.
75. R. HUDSON, supra note 9, at 2.
76. M. HEWSTONE. supra note 73, at 3.
77. Id.
78. EUROPEAN COMMUNITY INFORMATION SERVICE, supra note 1, at 2.
79. H. WALLACE & A. RIDLEY. EUROPE: THE CHALLENGE OF DIVERSITY 62 (1985)
[hereinafter H. WALLACE].
80. Id.
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net effect of numerous decisions over a period of time will leave all
better off, even though everyone will have suffered from some of
them.""' To arrive at the most appropriate policy decision, the bene-
fits and disadvantages to both the EC and the individual members
must be considered. 82
The EEC Treaty devotes attention to agricultural, economic,
energy, industrial, regional, and social affairs policies.8 Recently,
the EEC has debated on the economic policy of regulating intellec-
tual property rights. Intellectual property primarily focuses on copy-
rights, trademarks, patents, and trade secrets."4 Copyrights, in par-
ticular, have been the subject of much recent attention in the EEC.
In fact, it was the broadcasters' copyrights in television programs
that resulted in the recent controversy over whether such copyrights
were applicable to derivative market products.
A copyright is the author's right' to prevent other individuals
from using the author's original work in certain ways. 85 Original
literature, drama, art, or music is entitled to copyright protection. 6
"A copyright protects the fixed tangible expression of an idea and
not the idea itself."87 Remedies for copyright infringement include
injunctions, actual damages, and dislodgement of profits. 88
The EEC Treaty does not set up its own system for regulating
intellectual property, but allows the EC Member States to create
individual legislation regarding copyright protection.89 England's
statutes provide that television programs can be granted a copy-
right.9" The United Kingdom's Copyright Act of 1956 states that the
copyright in a television broadcast restricts the use of protected ma-
terial in making cinematograph films or in rebroadcasting the
material."
81. Id. at 63.
82. Id. at 62.
83. R. HUDSON. supra note 9, at 10.
84. R. JUSTIS & R. JUDD, FRANCHISING 120 (1989) [hereinafter R. JUSTIS]. Trademarks
are words, names, symbols, or devices that businesses use to promote consumer identification
of their company's goods as well as to distinguish them from goods that are manufactured and
sold by other competitors. Id. at 121. Patents are intellectual property rights that grant the
owner the power to exclude others from producing, using, or selling an item for a specified
period, which is limited by statute. Id. at 128. A trade secret is "any formula, pattern, device,
or compilation of information which is used in one's business, and which gives the owner an
opportunity to obtain an advantage over competitors who do not know or use it." Id. at 131.
85. Id. at 126.
86. See United Kingdom's Copyright Act, 1956, § 2, 7 Halsbury Statutes of England §
2 (3rd ed. 1969).
87. R. JUSTICE, supra note 84,-at 127.
88. Id. at 128.
89. McKeough, Intellectual Property Protection and Freedom of Competition, I IN-
TELL. PROP. J. 237, 239 (1984-85).
90. See United Kingdom's Copyright Act, 1956, § 14, 7 Halsbury Statutes of England §
14(l)(a) (3rd ed. 1969).
91. See United Kingdom's Copyright Act, 1956, § 14, 7 Halsbury Statutes of England §
14(4) (3rd ed. 1969).
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Due to the small size of most European countries, television
broadcasts can usually be received in neighboring countries.9" If sov-
ereign states are allowed to control the type and degree of broadcast-
ing within its territory, this geographic proximity enhances the po-
tential for conflicts.93 Technological advancements have further
improved transborder viewing choices. 4 Therefore, the issue of copy-
rights needed to be addressed by the European Economic Commu-
nity. The EEC is not interested in formulating their own intellectual
property laws. Instead, it has chosen to focus on the interaction be-
tween Member States' national copyright laws and how these laws
affect the European Community.95
Application of copyright laws within the European Economic
Community has raised the issue of "whether the enforcement of
copyright by national territories conflicts with the EEC Treaty."'
The purpose of EEC Member States' intellectual property laws is
based on the exception to the rule that "anyone is free to copy and
sell any item on the market. 97
In contrast to this protectionist view, Articles 85 and 86 of the
EEC Treaty focus on safeguarding consumer interests from unfair
competition within the Community.98 In particular, Article 85 pro-
hibits actions or agreements that prevent, restrict, or destroy compe-
tition among European Community members.99 Article 86 of the
EEC Treaty prohibits EC members from exploiting a dominant mar-
ket position when this position has detrimental effects on promoting
unity within the EEC. 10 Since the abuse of a dominant position is
not in the interests of consumers, Article 86 attempts to regulate
unfair pricing and arbitrary refusals to supply goods.'
VI. Recent Applications of the EEC Treaty with Regards to Intel-
lectual Property
In July 1991 the European Communities Court had the oppor-
tunity to rule on the controversy between national copyright protec-
tion and unfair competition in violation of Articles 85 and 86 of the
EEC Treaty. These cases, British Broadcasting Corporation and
92. Glenn, Legal Issues Affecting Licensing of T.V. Programs in the European Eco-
nomic Community, 33 COPYRIGHT L. SYMP. (ASCAP) 115, 121 (1987).
93. Deringer, supra note 7, at 21.
94. Glenn, supra note 92, at 121.
95. McKeough, supra note 89, at 239. In 1959, the European Commission began work-
ing with the EEC members to harmonize intellectual property law. Id.
96. Glenn, supra note 92, at 151.
97. McKeough, supra note 89, at 238.
98. Eccles, Aaron & Partners, Maitland-Walker, & Risdons, The European Commu-
nit)' and the Consumer, 86 LAW SocY' GAZETTE 14, 16 (1989) [hereinafter Eccles].
99. EEC Treaty, supra note 2, art. 85.
100. Id., art. 86.
101. Eccles, supra note 98, at 17.
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Another v. Commission of the European Communities; Independent
Television Publications Limited v. Commission of the European
Communities; and Radio Telefis Eireann v. Commission of the Eu-
ropean Communities, involved two broadcasting corporations in
England and one broadcasting company in Ireland regarding their
control over broadcast listings.
All of the residents of Ireland and 30-40% of the individuals in
Northern Ireland receive at least six television channels.102 Through
government regulations of public broadcasting, the Irish broadcaster,
Radio Telefis Eireann (RTE), has acquired a monopoly to provide
National radio and television broadcasting for its two stations, RTE-
1 and RTE-2.103 A duopoly is the condition in the market when
there are essentially only two producers or sellers of a given product.
Therefore, the two British broadcasters, British Broadcasting Corpo-
ration (BBC) and Independent Broadcasting Authority (IBA), func-
tion as a duopoly in the broadcasting market in England. 10 4
Each broadcasting organization provided their own specialized
television guide. Independent Television Publications Ltd. (ITP, the
program publishing branch of IBA), BBC and RTE published
weekly television guides entitled "T.V.. Times," "Radio Times," and
the "RTE Guide" respectively.105 These television guides only con-
tained information about the broadcaster's own programs. Each
broadcaster claimed "[a] copyright in its weekly program listing
preventing their reproduction by third parties under the United
Kingdom's Copyright Act of 1956 and the Irish Copyright Act of
1963."1o6
ITP, BBC, and RTE allowed newspapers to publish the televi-
sion listings free of charge, however, not without imposing certain
restrictions.'0 The newspapers could only print the broadcasting
schedule for the next twenty-four hour period during weekdays and
for the upcoming forty-eight hour period on weekends and holi-
102. Independent Television Publications Limited v. Commission of the European Com-
munities, No. T-76/89, at 2 (E. Comm. Ct. J. July 10, 1991) (LEXIS, Eurcom library, Cases
file) [hereinafter ITP v. Commission].
103. BBC v. Commission, at 2 (E. Comm. Ct. J. July 10, 1991) (LEXIS, Eurcom li-
brary, Cases file).
104. Id. Each broadcaster provides tow national television stations: BBC-l and BBC-2
are provided by British Broadcasting Corporation, Channel 4 and ITV are provided by Inde-
pendent Broadcasting Authority; and RTE-I and RTE-2 are provided by the Irish broad-
caster, Radio Telefis Eireann. Id.
105. Re The Magill T.V. Guide: Radio Telefis Eireann and Others v. E.C. Commission,
1989 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 1141, -, 4 Comm. Mkt. L.R. 749, 752 [hereinafter RTE v.
Commission].
106. BBC v. Commission, at 2 (E. Comm. Ct. J. July 10, 1991) (LEXIS, Eurcom li-
brary, Cases file).
107. RTE v. Commission, 1989 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. at - , 4 Comm. Mkt. L.R. at
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days.'0 8 Meanwhile, newspapers that were printed only once a week
could not list a complete broadcasting schedule, but instead were
only permitted to highlight the programs for the upcoming week. 10 9
ITP, BBC, and RTE refused to grant licenses to independent busi-
nesses in England and Ireland who were interested in creating and
providing the public with a comprehensive weekly television guide. 1' 0
The three broadcasters excluded others from entering the subsidiary
market of television guides with the sole intention of preserving their
current monopoly. These protectionist actions exceeded the copyright
protection permitted under EC law."'
In May and June of 1986 an Irish publishing company, Magill,
produced a comprehensive weekly television guide. This guide gave
details "of all programs broadcast on ITV, Channel 4, BBC-1, BBC-
2, RTE-I and RTE-2"" 2 The three broadcasters claimed Magill had
infringed their copyrights and successfully acquired injunctions to
stop Magill's production of the weekly guides. 113 On April 4, 1986,
Magill filed a complaint with the Commission claiming that ITP,
BBC, and RTE "were abusing their dominant position on the market
by refusing to grant licenses for the publication of the weekly pro-
gram listings."" 4
A. Article 85
Article 85 strictly prohibits agreements, decisions, or actions
that intend or result in the prevention, restriction, or distortion of
competition among EC Member States."15 At first glance, intellec-
tual property rights seem to conflict with the objectives set forth by
the European Community."' "While the member countries are com-
mitted to eliminating impediments to cross-border flow of goods
within the Common Market, the individual EC countries, however,
continue to protect the intellectual property rights of their residents
against importation of goods that infringe these rights.""17 The pro-
tection of free trade requires the EC to destroy existing barriers to
108. Id.
109. Id. A complete broadcasting schedule is each station's independent listing of the
full program schedule for the week. A highlight of programs is when limited information is
given about upcoming shows but it is not a full listing of the entertainment schedule. Id.
110. Id. A comprehensive weekly television guide would be a cumulative guide of all the
television shows planned for the week on all stations (i.e., ITP, BBC, and RTE). id.
I 1l. Article 86 v. Prices and Copyrights, The Financial Times Limited, Aug. 1991, at 2
[hereinafter Article 86 v. Prices and Copyright].
112. RTE v. Commission, 1989 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. at -, 4 Comm. Mkt. L.R. at
752.
113. Id.
114. Id.
115. EEC Treaty, supra note 2, art. 85.
116. Keating, supra note 12, at 54-55.
117.. Id.
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the flow of commerce while simultaneously ensuring that new imped-
iments to free trade are not created.
1 8
Article 85 is most often violated through licensing agree-
ments. 1 9 Since copyrights have the potential to generate monopoly
profits, they must be regulated to ensure that competition is not un-
necessarily restricted.120 In an attempt to protect their own product
market, the three television broadcasters refused to grant licenses to
third parties who were interested in entering this lucrative market of
comprehensive entertainment guides. "By limiting the scope of their
licensing policies so as to prevent the sale of comprehensive television
guides, they restricted competition to the prejudice of the
consumer." 
1 21
The objective of Article 85 is to promote healthy competition
within the European Community.1 2' Encouraging'free trade through-
out the Member States yields three benefits in particular: increased
competition; specialization based on comparative advantages; and
more efficient use of scale economies.1 23
In general, the ease with which new third parties may enter a
field to compete with established businesses is a key feature of a
competitive market.124 Unless the barriers prohibiting the free flow
of trade are removed, Member States will focus on national rather
than continental markets, and therefore, the Member States will be
"unable to benefit from the economies of scale which a truly unified
internal market offers." 1 25 Under the current circumstances ITP,
BBC, and RTE were denying third parties licenses to the program
listing information in a direct attempt to limit competition. In other
words, if the three broadcasters did not grant licenses to indepen-
dent, interested, third parties, they would not have to worry about
maintaining their respective market shares in the comprehensive tel-
evision guide market. This philosophy is protectionistic and is in op-
118. McKeough, supra note 89, at 241.
119. Id. at 263.
120. Id. at 246.
121. Competition, 86 LAW Soc'v GUARDIAN GAZETTE 44, 45 (1989).
122. EEC Treaty, supra note 2, art. 85.
123. R. ABRAMS, supra note 28, at 13. The close proximity of the EC states yields low
trade costs which means that the benefits realized from comparative advantage are likely to be
smaller than the potential for improved competition and increased economies of scale. Id. at
54.
The free movement of goods is a central objective among EC members, however, this
principle does not apply when trading occurs with non-members to the EC. McKeough, supra
note 89, at 259. Although trade agreements with non-members may parallel Article 30 of the
EEC Treaty, the EC Court will not recognize them as equivalent. Id. at 260. The EC Courts
have substantiated this decision by viewing the EEC Treaty as purposefully creating an inter-
nal market for free trade while "treaties with other countries were mere trade agreements."
id.
124. Phillips, Looking Toward 1992: European Copyright Harmonisation and Software
Development, 5 COMPUTER L. & PRAC. 53, 55 (1988).
125. Completing the Internal Market, supra note 5, part I, § 1 (60).
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position to the basic pursuit of free trade which is emphasized by the
European Economic Community. The EC Court held that "compa-
nies can not unreasonably sit on their intellectual property rights in
order to stifle enterprise and prevent the emergency of new forms of
competition."' 26
B. Article 86
Magill's complaint alleged that ITP, BBC, and RTE were in
violation of Article 86 of the EEC Treaty. 127 The court held that for
an action to be in violation of Article 86, the following three ele-
ments must be successfully established: (1) the existence of a domi-
nant position must be evident; (2) this dominant position must be
abused; and (3) the possibility that trade between Member States
may be detrimentally affected."2 8
A dominant position has been defined as "a position of economic
strength enjoyed by an undertaking which enables it to behave to an
appreciable extent independently of its competitors, customers or of
its consumers. 1 29 To determine whether a party holds a dominant
position, the relevant market must be clearly defined.1 30 The Com-
mission decided that the relevant product markets were ITP's,
BBC's, and RTE's advance weekly program listings, as well as their
respective television guides. 31
Magill showed that ITP, BBC, and RTE, in effect, held monop-
olistic positions since outside parties who were interested in publish-
ing comprehensive weekly television guides were dependent on these
broadcasters granting such licenses."3 2 "A position of economic de-
pendence is characteristic of the existence of a dominant posi-
tion."' 3 By establishing a position of economic dependence, Magill
met the first element under Article 86.
Magill met the second element by arguing that ITP, BBC, and
RTE abused their dominant positions by claiming copyright protec-
tion. By refusing to grant licenses for advance weekly program list-
ings, the broadcasters prevented third parties from selling weekly tel-
evision guides.13 ' These broadcasters, ITP, BBC, and RTE, each
126. National Copyright Laws Don't Shield Abuses of Dominant Position in E.C., Int'l
Bus. Daily (BNA) 1, 3 (Aug. 12, 1991) [hereinafter National Copyright Laws].
127. BBC v. Commission, at 4 (E. Comm. Ct. J. July 10, 1991) (LEXIS, Eurcom li-
brary, Cases file).
128. Volvo A.B. v. Erik Veng Limited, 1988 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 6211, __, 4
Comm. Mkt. L.R. 122, 130 (1989) [hereinafter Volvo v. Veng].
129. McKeough, supra note 89, at 266.
130. BBC v. Commission, at 4 (E. Comm. Ct. J. July 10, 1991) (ILEXIS, Eurcom li-
brary, Cases file).
131. Id.
132. Id.
133. Id.
134. RTE v. Commission, 1989 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. at __, 4 Comm. Mkt. L.R. at
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published guides which were "commercial activities totally unrelated
to their main activity of broadcasting. 1 3 5 The third parties who
were interested in producing comprehensive television guides, as well
as the viewers, created a demand in the market for comprehensive
television program listings.13 ' The Commission recognized the broad-
casters' dominant position in the program information market and
said that this position was abused when the broadcasters denied the
introduction of general television guides, despite the potential de-
mand.1 37 Copyrights were a property right, however, this did not en-
title the broadcasters to exploit this right for predatory marketing
strategy purposes. The broadcasters' exploitation of their copyrights
in the program listings placed ITP, BBC, and RTE "in a position to
hinder the emergence of any effective competition on the market for
information on its weekly programs." 138
If, however, the "broadcasters had elected not to disseminate
the information to anyone the results may have been different."'' 39
The abuse of a dominant position can be substantiated by demon-
strating that the broadcasters used the information in their own tele-
vision guides for their personal economic gain. 40 In addition, the EC
court also thought it was significant that the broadcasters provided
the program listing information to daily newspapers and weekly
guides that did not compete with their products. For these reasons,
the court held that ITP, BBC, and RTE arbitrarily and discrimina-
torily denied this program information to third parties who wanted
to formulate comprehensive television magazines. "'
The denial of a license to use a copyright product may in fact
be a violation of Community laws. However, a denial of a license is
not necessarily an abuse of intellectual property rights because the
intellectual property interest grants the owner the right to control
the protected property. " 2 To determine whether the denial of a li-
cense is contrary to the EEC Treaty's goals, the court must deter-
mine the copyright owner's intentions for not allowing third parties
to use the product. 43
In Volvo v. Veng, the copyright owner's intention was not an
abuse of a dominant position. The EC Court determined that Volvo
750.
135. BBC v. Commission, at 15 (E. Comm. Ct. J. July 10, 1991) (LEXIS, Eurcom
library, Cases file).
136. Id.
137. National Copyright Laws, supra note 126, at 1.
138. BBC v. Commission, at 16 (E. Comm. Ct. J. July 10, 1991) (LEXIS, Eurcom
library, Cases file).
139. Id. at 10.
140. Id.
141. Id.
142. Id. at 17.
143. Id.
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was entitled to copyright protection for its design of certain car
parts."'4 Volvo was entitled to "prevent third parties from manufac-
turing, selling or importing products incorporating the design with-
out its consent because this constituted the very subject matter of the
exclusive right [in intellectual property]."'4 5 The mere fact that
third parties are willing to pay royalties to obtain such a license
should not obligate the copyright owner to provide the license.' 46 De-
manding that a license be granted in such a situation would deny the
owner the primary substance and intended benefit of having an ex-
clusive right.1"7 Therefore, properly exercising 'an intellectual prop-
erty right should not be considered an abuse of a dominant
position.""
The broadcasters' cases were distinguishable from the Volvo
case. In the Volvo case, the manufacturer's copyright in the design
of spare parts "was within the area of Volvo's main business activ-
ity."' 49 The broadcasters, on the other hand, were strategically limit-
ing the use of their television program copyrights to dominate and
control the derivative market of program publications.15 ° The EC
Court held that the publishing market was a downstream market of
broadcasting and should be considered a separate economic
activity."'
In order to pursue this economic venture third parties must ob-
tain licenses from the copyright holder before reprinting the program
listings. If the denial of a license is arbitrary, involves price fixing at
unfair levels, or affects trade between Member States, then denying
a license may be an abuse of a dominant position, and in violation of
Article 86.152 Although ITP's, BBC's, and RTE's program listings
were protected by copyrights, the European Community Court held
that these broadcasters could not manipulate their rights to exclude
potential competition from the derivative market of weekly television
guides. 5 '
As long as the fundamental principles of the EEC Treaty were
not comprised, program listings were entitled to national copyright
protection.' 54 Here, the broadcasters used their "exclusive right to
144. Volvo v. Veng, 1988 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. at __, 4 Comm. Mkt. L.R. at 122.
145. Id.
146. Id.
147. Id.
148. Id.
149. ITP v. Commission, at 10 (E. Comm. Ct. J. July 10, 1991) (LEXIS, Eurcom li-
brary, Cases file).
150. Id.
151. Id.
152. Volvo v. Veng, 1988 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. at __, 4 Comm. Mkt. L.R. at 122.
153. BBC v. Commission, at 19 (E. Comm. Ct. J. July 10, 1991) (LEXIS, Eurcom
library, Cases file).
154. BBC v. Commission, at 19 (E. Comm. Ct. J. July 10, 1991) (LEXIS, Eurocom
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reproduce the listings as the instrument of a policy contrary to the
objectives of Article 86, going beyond what was necessary to ensure
the protection of the actual substance of its copyright and committed
an abuse within the meaning of Article 86."'1 1
To establish the third element of an Article 86 violation, Magill
needed to show that trade among Member States was affected. Arti-
cle 36 provides a method to analyze the third element under Article
86 of the EEC Treaty.15 Article 36 of the EEC Treaty allows intel-
lectual property rights that are established by national laws to be
protected under certain conditions.'57 The European Economic Com-
munity Treaty promotes free movement of goods. While national in-
tellectual property rights restrict the free movement of goods, Article
36 permits such restrictions as long as the limitations do not "consti-
tute a means of arbitrary discrimination or a disguised restriction on
trade between Member States.' 15
The copyright owner's exercise of the exclusive right to
reproduce a protected work is not necessarily in violation of Article
86.' The facts of each case must be analyzed to see whether the
copyright owner's intent is to promote a personal objective that is
contrary to the goals of Article 86.160 The concept of intellectual
property was developed to safeguard the inventor's time and finan-
cial resources expended in the creation of this new product.
Intellectual property rights serve to reward the creator for de-
veloping the new product, as well as simultaneously serving to pro-
tect against the incentive for third parties to pirate this new product
without giving any financial consideration to the initial developer. If
third parties could easily assimilate these ideas into their own prod-
ucts, with no duty of remuneration to the inventor, there would be no
incentive for creators to invest large amounts of money in research
and development of new products, even though these items would
benefit the consumer community. While intellectual property rights,
such as the copyrights in television broadcasting, are protectionistic
to some extent, they do not permit arbitrary or discriminatory refus-
als to third parties interested in paying the copyright holder for use
of his legally protected materials. Article 36 protection of intellec-
tual property can not be properly invoked when the copyright is be-
ing used in a manner contrary to its essential function of protecting
library, Cases file).
155. Id.
156. EEC Treaty, supra note 2, arts. 36, 86.
157. EEC Treaty, supra note 2, art. 36.
158. Id.
159. BBC v. Commission, at 17 (E. Comm. Ct. J. July 10, 1991) (LEXIS, Eurcom
library, Cases file).
160. Id.
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the creator's rights and rewarding such creativity."' 1
When copyright protection is abused, the fundamental princi-
ples of freedom of competition and free movement of goods allows
Community law to supersede national intellectual property law. 10 2
ITP, BBC, and RTE denied licenses to third parties in an attempt to
prevent the introduction of a new product, the comprehensive televi-
sion guide. The broadcasters were attempting to limit competition
with their comprehensive guides, which had developed into an ancil-
lary market to their copyrighted television programs.16 Despite the
potential consumer demand for the new product proposed by Magill
and other interested third parties, the broadcasters were attempting
to exclude any possible competition with their independent television
guides. 64 The EC Court held that the broadcasters were manipulat-
ing their copyrights to create a monopoly on a derivative market,
and such an abuse was not permitted under Community law.'
The Commission found ITP, BBC, and RTE in violation of Ar-
ticle 86, and it ordered the broadcasters to allow third parties to
reproduce the advance weekly program listings upon request and on
a non-discriminatory basis.166 The Commission's holding was ap-
pealed to the European Court of Justice. While the order was being
appealed, the European Community's Court of Justice President
granted the three broadcasters an interim stay from the Commis-
sion's decision.'67 This interim suspension was granted since the issue
of copyright protection versus Article 86 was still controversial. 6 8
Moreover, the Court of Justice felt that if the Commission's order
was eventually annulled by the Court, serious and irreparable dam-
age might result to innocent third parties who had relied on the
Commission's decision to their detriment.6 9
On appeal, the EC Court agreed with the Commission. They
held that the appellant's relevant product markets were their weekly
program listings and their respective television guides.1 70 In review-
ing these cases the court recognized that Section 14 of the United
Kingdom's Copyright Act of 1956 protects the broadcasting of tele-
161. Id.
162. Id. at 18. "Community law" is the law that governs the European Community
rather than trying to apply numerous and varied forms of Member States' national law.
163. Id.
164. EEC Competition Policy, supra note 3, at 2.
165. BBC v. Commission, at 18 (E. Comm. Ct. J. July 10, 1991) (LEXIS, Eurcom
library, Cases file).
166. RTE v. Commission, 1989 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. at -, 4 Comm. Mkt. L.R. at
753.
167. Id. at - , 4 Comm. Mkt. L.R. at 750.
168. Id.
169. Id.
170. BBC v. Commission, at 14 (E. Comm. Ct. J. July 10, 1991) (LEXIS Eurcom li-
brary, Cases file).
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vision programs. 7' However, the Court decided that the broad-
caster's program listings and television guides did not come under
the copyright protection of "market for broadcasting services" or in
the alternative the "market for information on television pro-
grams. 172 The Court determined that television listings were en-
tirely separate from program broadcasting, and more analogous to
publishing since these listings develop into the guides.173 This ruling
correctly recognized that while copyrights, and other forms of intel-
lectual property do indeed deserve protection, this protection must be
limited within certain boundaries. Copyrights in a given property
item are permissible, but the court pointed out that if derivative
market products were extended this same protection, then what
about products that stem from these derivative market products? For
example, advertising that appears in the comprehensive television
guides, should this be covered by these copyrights as well? A definite
line needs to be established so the legal rights of intellectual property
owners can be properly and evenly administered.
C. The Berne Convention
The Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artis-
tic Works was a catalyst in developing copyright protection on an
international level. 74 Article 5 of the Berne Convention provides
that foreign works and authors will be protected in the same manner
as the Member States protect their national works.' 75 Therefore,
members' national copyright laws must equal, but may exceed, the
minimum standard established by the Convention. 7
The broadcasters, ITP, BBC, and RTE, asserted that since all
Member States of the EC were parties to the Berne Convention, this
agreement was binding and must be recognized in Community
171. See United Kingdom's Copyright Act, 1956, § 14, 7 Halsbury Statutes of England
§ 14(1)(a) (3rd ed. 1969).
172. BBC v. Commission, at 14 (E. Comm. Ct. J. July 10, 1991) (LEXIS, Eurcom
library, Cases file).
173. Id. at 15.
174. Comment, Berne-ing the Soviet Copyright Codes: Will the U.S.S.R. Alter Its
Copyright Laws to Comply with the Berne Convention?, 8 DICK. J. INT'L L. 395, 397 (1990)
(authored by William Goldman) [hereinafter Berne-ing the Soviet Copyright Codes]. The
Berne Convention in 1886 consisted of ten nationsinterested in pursuing copyright protection
independent of national boundaries. 3 M. NIMMER & D. NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT: A
TREATISE ON THE LAW OF LITERARY, MUSICAL AND ARTISTIC PROPERTY, AND THE PROTEC-
TION OF IDEAS, § 17.01 [B], at 17-6 (1991). The Berne Convention has been revised approxi-
mately every twenty years, with the most recent update being the Paris Act of July 24, 1971.
Today the Berne Convention has a membership of seventy-seven participating countries. Id.
175. Berne Convention, 1886, reprinted in S. ROTHENBERG, COPYRIGHT LAW: BASIC &
RELATED MATERIALS 441 (1956). The Berne Convention's goal is to "provide all authors with
the most comprehensive set of rights that may possibly be granted." Berne-ing the Soviet
Copyright Codes, supra note 174, at 398.
176. Berne-ing the Soviet Copyright Codes, supra note 174, at 398. Unless specifically
provided otherwise, the Berne Convention rules are superior to national legislation. Id.
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law. 1" In support of its decision in the broadcasters' cases, the Com-
mission stressed two reasons why the Berne Convention did not ap-
ply. First, the Commission quoted a 1962 case, Commission v. Italy,
in which the standard was established that "in matters governed by
the EEC Treaty, that Treaty takes precedence over agreements con-
cluded between Member States before its entry into force." 1" Sec-
ond, the Commission believed that the Berne Convention was not
applicable because copyright protection under this agreement would
not have been extended to cover program listings. 179
Considering both the broadcasters' and the Commission's argu-
ments, the EC Court held that infringement claims of the 1886
Berne Convention among EEC members were insufficient to over-
come violations of the EEC Treaty. 8 ' The Court pointed out that,
despite the individual nations' membership, the European Commu-
nity, as an entity, was not a member of the Berne Convention, and
therefore, was not bound by such an agreement.' "Article 234 of
the EEC Treaty governs the relationship between the provisions of
the Treaty and pre-existing agreements between non-EC countries
and EC countries."' 2 The court decided that although the United
Kingdom and Ireland ratified the Berne Convention prior to their
accession to the EEC in January 1973, the ratification neither af-
fected nor altered the provisions of the EEC Treaty. 8 3 The EC
Court felt that, under Article 234, previous agreements between EC
and non-EC members did supersede the EEC Treaty. However, Ar-
ticle 234 rendered that the same pre-existing agreements were not
controlling, but instead were submissive to the EEC Treaty when
only EC Member States were involved.18 4
D. The Decision's Impact
The final resolution of the cases between Magill and the televi-
sion broadcasters has resulted in free competition between "program
177. BBC v. Commission, at 23 (E. Comm. Ct. J. July 10, 1991) (LEXIS, Eurcom
library, Cases file).
178. Id., Commission v. Italy, 1962 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 1,
179. BBC v. Commission, at 23 (E. Comm. Ct. J. July 10, 1991) (LEXIS, Eurcom
library, Cases file).
180. Id. at 24.
181. Id.
182. National Copyright Laws, supra note 126, at 2. Article 234 of the EEC Treaty
states:
[T]he rights and obligations resulting from conventions concluded prior to
the entry into force of this Treaty between one or more member states on the
one hand and one or more third countries on the other hand shall not be affected
by the provisions of this Treaty.
EEC Treaty, supra note 2, art. 234.
183. BBC v. Commission, at 24 (E. Comm. Ct. J. July 10, 1991) (LEXIS, Eurcom
library, Cases file).
184. National Copyright Laws, supra note 126, at 2.
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listing" guides. 185 Although the listings were protected by copyright
law, "national intellectual property law has to be reconciled with the
basic principles of free movement and competition of the EEC
Treaty." '186 In this case, the copyright was used for purposes con-
trary to Article 86.187 Article 3(1) of Regulation 17 empowers the
Commission
to order a party to do certain acts or provide certain advantages
which have been wrongfully withheld, as well as prohibiting the
continuation of certain actions, practices or situations which are
contrary to the Treaty.188
The European Community Court decided that the Commission's or-
der for the broadcasters to provide the requested program listings to
third parties on a non-discriminatory basis was not in violation of
Article 3 of Regulation Number 17.189 However, the required dis-
closure of program listings does not extend to information beyond
the listings themselves.190
The two English broadcasters each enjoy a weekly television
guide circulation of three million copies which generates a large fi-
nancial inflow. 91 In accordance with the recent court decisions, the
broadcasters must provide licenses to third parties who desire pro-
gram listing information. 92 English copyright law has permitted ITP
and BBC to charge substantial fees to third parties who are acquir-
ing these licenses.1 93 This deregulation became effective March 1,
1991, and it has permitted the English broadcasters to have two new
sources of income from "the charges for weekly listings (which they
used to keep to themselves) and also for daily listings (which they
used to give away free)."1 94 Fees from newspapers alone could pro-
vide the British broadcasting duopoly with an annual income in-
creased to several million pounds. 195 The broadcasters never tried
this method of exercising their intellectual property rights before.
185. Article 86 v. Prices and Copyright, supra note Il l, at 1.
186. Id. at 2.
187. Id.
188. BBC v. Commission, at 22 (E. Comm. Ct. J. July 10, 1991) (LEXIS, Eurcom
library, Cases file).
189. Id. at 23.
190. Radio Telefis Eireann v. Commission of the European Communities, No. T-69/89,
at 5 (E. Comm. Ct. J. July 10, 1991) (LEXIS, Eurcom library, Cases file) [hereinafter RTE
v. Commission, No. T-69/89].
191. The T. V. Listings Market; The Duopoly Strikes Back, 1991 The Economist News-
paper Ltd., Feb. 2, 1991, at 53 [hereinafter The TY. Listings Market]. In 1988 RTE had
weekly program sales averaging 123,000 copies in Ireland and 6,500 copies in Northern Ire-
land. RTE v. Commission, No. T-69/89, at 3.
192. BBC v. Commission, at 22 (E. Comm. Ct. J. July 10, 1991) (LEXIS, Eurcom
library, Cases file).
193. The TY. Listings Market, supra note 191, at 54.
194. Id.
195. Id.
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They may find that, to their surprise, the financial benefits resulting
from deregulation are greater than the protectionistic strategy they
previously pursued. Since this mandated deregulation is still in its
initial stages of implementation the courts may be asked to advise
the broadcasters and third parties on structural problems as they
arise.
After the effects of deregulation start to materialize, the courts
may again be asked to balance the benefits of third parties' rights to
program listings versus the burden placed upon parties, such as the
newspaper staffs, who previously received this information without
having to pay for it.' Even if a party can show anti-competitive
effects on his trade, a party that alleges Article 85 and 86 violations
of the EEC Treaty, may be denied relief because the long term bene-
fits to the consumer are greater. 19'
VII. Conclusion
Development of the EEC involved the transformation of previ-
ously independent countries into a single entity with a homogeneous
community comprised of 300 million individuals."" The resulting
Community law focuses on promoting the EEC objective of estab-
lishing and strengthening a single market among Member States. 99
Agreements that partition national markets or affect competition
within the European Community may threaten the free flow of trade
among Member States.2"' Article 86 applies when this abusive con-
duct has the capacity to affect intermarket trade, regardless of
whether such an effect is real or presently being experienced.2"'
Magill was able to show that the three broadcast-
ers-Independent Television Publications, British Broadcasting Cor-
poration, and Radio Telefis Eireann-by their refusal to grant third
parties the right to compile comprehensive program listings, effec-
tively altered the competition in the television guide market. 202 In
this case, the abuse of the dominant position did have the potential
to affect trade among Member States, such as the United Kingdom
and Ireland in particular. 03 The past success of television guides
produced by ITP, BBC, and RTE indicated that a potential market
196. Id. "Regional newspapers will now face a bill of $27.7 million for information
which has been free for the past thirty years." Id.
197. Eccles, supra note 98, at 16.
198. Keating, supra note 12, at 53.
199. BBC v. Commission, at 20 (E. Comm. Ct. J. July 10, 1991) (LEXIS, Eurcom
library, Cases file).
200. Id.
201. Id.
202. Id.
203. Id.
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demand for a comprehensive television listing existed °.2 0  By denying
third parties the right to enter broadcasting's derivative market of
entertainment guides, the broadcasters have potentially affected
trade flows between the EC members. This adverse effect on trade is
sufficient to establish an Article 86 violation. 0 5
The EC desires to harmonize copyright laws among its Member
States. "The ideal copyright harmonization law would not discrimi-
nate between nationals of Member States, nor conflict with the EEC
Treaty, and would uphold the intrinsic qualities which copyright is
apt to protect. 206 The Commission's actions towards this goal, how-
ever, are not unlimited since Article 100 of the EEC Treaty requires
an obvious nexus between any harmonization directive and its result-
ing effect on the European Community.20 7 Harmonizing Community
laws would even out the differences between Member States' na-
tional intellectual property laws.2 08 These adjustments in intellectual
property laws would allow regulations governing copyright laws to be
a uniform standard for all EC members.2"9 "As long as any laws
granting exclusive rights to deal in goods exist, the European Com-
munity's objectives of free movement of goods and freedom of com-
petition cannot be fully achieved."21
EEC Treaty Article 86 violations in effect nullify national copy-
right laws. Since national laws are superseded by Community law
when a conflict arises, an owner who inappropriately uses his intel-
lectual property right to limit competition or to prevent the develop-
ment of downstream markets will not be granted copyright protec-
tion.2" In July 1991 through the broadcasters' cases, the European
Community's Court of Justice explicated the important principle
that "national protection of copyright cannot be used by companies
to sit on their intellectual property in order to stifle. other businesses
and competition."21 2
Lynne Kimberly Law
204. Id. At the time of the litigation consumers had to purchase separate television
guides to plan their entertainment schedule since no comprehensive program listing existed.
EEC Competition Policy, supra note 3, at 10. These publications represented substantial in-
come to the broadcasters. For example, BBC's television guide had a weekly circulation of
three million copies. Id. at 11.
205. BBC v. Commission, at 20-21 (E. Comm. Ct. J. July 10, 1991) (LEXIS, Eurcom
library, Cases file).
206. McKeough, supra note 89, at 269-70.
207. Glenn, supra note 92, at 154. See also EEC Treaty, supra note 2, art. 100.
208. Glenn, supra note 92, at 154.
209. McKeough, supra note 89, at 268.
210. Id. at 243.
211. National Copyright Laws, supra note 126, at 3.
212. EEC Competition Policy, supra note 3, at 2.
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